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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
LITTLE AMERICA'S MINIMALIST ARGUMENT 
IGNORES THE BASIC RULE OF PREMISES LIABILITY LAW 
THAT AN OWNER OF PROPERTY HAS A DUTY TO 
MAKE AND KEEP ITS PROPERTY REASONABLY 
SAFE FOR ITS BUSINESS INVITEES. 
In its scholarly discussion of the particulars of 
Utah premises liability law, Little America loses focus on the 
forest of fundamental principles while examining the trees of 
distinctions between "creation" of a dangerous condition and 
"notice" of a dangerous condition. Probably the most pertinent 
of all Utah cases, given the big picture of this case and the 
duty of Little America to make and keep its premises reasonably 
safe for business invitees such as Ms. Weinstein, is Erickson 
v. Walgreen Drug Co., 232 P.2d 210 (Utah 1951). Ms. Weinstein 
commends that case to the Court's attention and urges the Court 
to review it very carefully with respect not only to its 
similarity to the facts of this case (a plaintiff's slipping 
and becoming injured on a defendant's slippery surface) but 
also for its statement of classic premises liability princi-
ples. In Erickson the Utah Supreme Court reversed a judgment 
entered on a verdict in favor of a plaintiff, but the upshot 
was a new trial, not a judgment for the defendant, and the 
reversal was predicated on the trial court's exclusion of 
certain evidence proffered by the defendant (non-occurrence of 
other injurious incidents) in support of its factual contention 
that it was not negligent. The primary analysis of that case 
1 
is supportive of Ms. Weinstein's position and most instructive 
with respect to the question of a landowner's duty to keep its 
premises reasonably safe in a situation remarkably similar to 
the instant situation. The plaintiff's primary contention in 
Erickson was that the premises owner 
knew or should have known of the propensi-
ties of the floor to become slippery when 
wet and was negligent in failing to warn 
customers using the entrance way of the 
hazard involved or to obviate the slippery 
condition . . . . 
232 P.2d at 211. 
The plaintiff's evidence in Erickson included testi-
mony that the surface had a tendency to be "quite slippery" 
when wet. Id. at 212. This is not unlike, for example, the 
testimony of witness Bruce Parker in this case (R. at 171-73), 
that he, a resident of Boston, Massachusetts (an area of the 
United States with a considerably wetter climate than Salt Lake 
City's), thought that the Little America surface was "extremely 
slippery" when he slipped on it shortly before Ms. Weinstein's 
injurious incident. 
The Supreme Court's analysis, leading to the conclu-
sion that Ms. Erickson had established a prima facie case, in-
cludes the following excerpts, all of which, Ms. Weinstein 
submits, are most instructive with respect to the issues before 
this Court: 
From all of the evidence, we think a jury 
could reasonably conclude that [the defen-
dant] knew or should have known of the 
propensities of its terrazzo entranceway to 
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become slippery when wet1 and should have 
realized that because of those propensities 
it created an unreasonable risk to business 
visitors who would not discover the slip-
pery condition and realize the risk 
involved therein.2 It is true that [the 
plaintiff] had crossed the terrazzo slab 
many times prior to the accident; that on 
this particular occasion she knew the ter-
razzo floor was wet and as a reasonable 
person should have realized the increased 
possibility of her slipping. Yet according 
to [plaintiff's expert], the terrazzo slab 
was quite slippery when wet and felt as 
though it did not contain any abrasive; 
that the slab was smooth and being 
constructed of terrazzo was more slippery 
when wet than the wet surface of other 
materials commonly used in entranceways. . 
. . As to these matters, we cannot, as a 
matter of law, charge [the plaintiff] with 
knowing. While the floor appears to have 
been initially constructed so as to be 
reasonably safe for travel, a jury could 
conclude the surface had, from continual 
wear, worn smooth and the abrasive become 
less effective to secure footing. 
While there is no evidence of any incident 
occurring which would have put [the defen-
dant] on notice that the terrazzo was slip-
pery when wet, such evidence is not neces-
sary to establish liability on the part of 
rthe defendant]. [The defendant 1 was in 
the actual possession of the building and 
had a duty to search out defects in the 
premises in order that they be reasonably 
safe for the presence of business visitors. 
xHere, as acknowledged by Little America (e.g., R. at 77, 
1078, 1079, 1197, 1248), it is undisputed that Little America 
knew its surface was slippery when wet. And John Stoner, Little 
America's head of safety and security, acknowledged that "wet 
pavement is hazardous." R. at 177. 
2Ms. Weinstein, at least as a matter of triable fact, was 
not aware of the risk she would encounter while walking on Little 
America's surface. See her Affidavit, R. at 215-16. Nor, pre-
sumably, was victim Walraven, an insurance claims adjuster by 
trade. 
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[I]n the instant case the jury could find 
that through constant wear the terrazzo 
slab had over a period of time become 
smooth, resulting in it being very slippery 
when wet. Although there was evidence that 
no one else had complained of falling on 
the terrazzo slab, it may have been so 
slippery when wet that [the defendant] 
should have known of that condition and 
realized that it subjected business visi-
tors to an unreasonable risk. 
With respect to the duty upon [the defen-
dant], the jury was instructed that . . . 
"it was the duty of [the defendant] to 
exercise reasonable care to keep the 
entranceway to its store reasonably safe 
for the use of its customers; and in this 
regard you are instructed that if you shall 
find from a preponderance of the evidence 
that the entranceway was not reasonably 
safe in that the floor of the entranceway 
had become wet from rainwater and slick and 
slippery and that [the defendant] knew or 
in the exercise of reasonable care should 
have known of said condition, and failed to 
exercise reasonable care to remedy said 
condition and make said entranceway reason-
ably safe for the use of its customers, by 
means of warning signs to advise of the 
slick condition or by covering the terrazzo 
entrance with rubber mats or other 
substances to prevent slipping,3 then rthe 
defendant] was negligent.' 
In the instant case [the defendant] can 
only be liable if the terrazzo floor when 
30ther cases have held that it may be incumbent on a premis-
es owner, with respect to its overall duty of care, to provide a 
safe passageway. See, e.g., Johnson v. Abbott Laboratories, 
Inc., 605 N.E.2d 1098, 1103 (111. App. 1992). There is no reason 
to conclude that this approach is contrary to Utah law. And it 
is uncontested that Little America offered Ms. Weinstein no 
alternative to traversing the slippery asphalt surface. 
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wet subjected business visitors to an un-
reasonable risk and [the defendant] either 
knew or by the exercise of reasonable care 
could have discovered that such a condition 
existed.4 
Id. at 212-214 (emphasis added). 
No development in Utah law since the Erickson case 
was decided has diminished the vitality or cogency of the fore-
going analysis. If one keeps in mind the facts that Little 
America knew of the slippery-when-wet condition; that witness 
Parker testified that it was "extremely slippery11; that victim 
Walraven slipped and fell and reported her incident to Little 
America a week before the Weinstein incident and slipped and 
nearly fell another time; that Ms. Walraven has characterized 
the wet surface as "very slick" (Little America's Brief at 27); 
that Ms. Weinstein fell when she did; that there is no evidence 
that any of those instances involved any "foreign substances" 
of the kinds left by non-parties,5 and that Little America has 
4It may be of interest to the Court that, in Erickson/ the 
plaintiff asserted claims against both the property developer, 
for creation of a dangerous condition (similar to Ms. Weinstein's 
contention regarding the application and non-treatment of the 
asphalt sealant) and against the lessee of the property ("the 
defendant" in the textual discussion). The trial judge let both 
claims go to the jury. The jury found in favor of the developer 
and against the lessee. 
^Little America unfairly accuses Ms. Weinstein of conve-
niently changing her theory. She did not know what material had 
smudged her clothing. She initially assumed that it was automo-
tive oil or some other such substance. As it became clear 
through discovery, including the depositions of Little America 
employees, that there was no such substance associated with her 
fall or that of any of the other victims, she concluded, as a 
matter of reasonable inference, that it was only the surface, 
itself, slickened by water, which had caused her to fall. 
5 
no evidence that any of those persons, including Ms. Weinstein, 
had any fault in any of those incidents, it all adds up, at a 
minimum, to triable questions of whether the condition was 
dangerous and whether Little America breached its duty to re-
frain from allowing such a condition to exist. 
The central question for jury determination in this 
case appears to be whether the condition of the surface was 
such that an unreasonable risk of harm was present. This 
Court, in Wagoner v. Waterslide, Inc., 744 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 
1987), addressed that question. In Wagoner, the plaintiff was 
injured riding down a water slide owned and operated by the 
defendant. A tendon in one of the plaintiff's toes was cut 
when the plaintiff, while descending the slide and rounding a 
curve, allowed his foot to hang over the side and to come into 
contact with the unfinished edge of the fiberglass slide. In 
the course of affirming judgment on a verdict for the defen-
dant, this Court stated: 
The initial issue is whether or not the 
condition of the water slide presented an 
unreasonable risk of harm to defendant's 
patrons. Whether an unreasonable risk of 
harm existed is a determination of fact to 
be made by the jury. 'The standard upon 
which negligence is gauged is that of ordi-
nary, reasonable care under the circum-
stances, which standard it is peculiarly 
fitting that juries determine.' DeWeese v. 
J.C. Penney, Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 119, 297 
P.2d 898, 901 (1956) . 
744 P.2d at 1013 (emphasis added). 
Ms. Weinstein contends that the wet asphalt surface 
constituted a hazardous condition (one which, in the words of 
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Wagoner, "presented an unreasonable risk of harm to [Little 
America's] patrons." She contends that it was, indeed, 
extremely slippery, and there is clearly evidence in the record 
to support that conclusion. Little America contends, apparent-
ly, that its surface was only as slippery when wet as is the 
normal asphalt surface. Ms. Weinstein does not concede that, 
if the surface was only "ordinarily" slippery when wet, Little 
America was ipso facto not negligent. There is, in any event, 
a legitimate jury question, in the totality of the circumstanc-
es, as to whether the condition was hazardous enough to create 
a duty in Little America to do anything about it (by providing 
a safe, non-slippery passageway, or by posting warning signs 
(as the Utah Supreme Court in Erickson seems to have acknowl-
edged might be reasonably required of a premises owner), or by 
taking other steps to remedy the condition, or, indeed, by hav-
ing refrained from setting up the situation, months earlier, 
with the use and non-treatment of the sealant). If the jury 
determines that the condition was such as to trigger the duty 
of Little America to do something about it or to have prevented 
its coming into existence, the liability issues should likely 
ultimately be resolved in Ms. Weinstein's favor, especially 
because Little America has acknowledged that there was no com-
parative negligence on her part. 
Ms. Weinstein contends that the most likely scenario 
is that the application of the sealant played a role in the 
phenomenon of the surface's being as slippery when wet as it 
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was. She contends that Little America should, at the outset, 
have added grit or sand to make the surface less slippery when 
wet. She acknowledges that she cannot prove, to a certainty, 
that it was the asphalt sealant that rendered the surface as 
slippery when wet as it was, but she need not prove that fact. 
Her discussion, in her original Brief, of the "creation" and 
"actual notice" prongs of premises liability law may itself be 
an example, less extreme than Little America's analysis, of 
failing to see the forest for the trees. For the particulars 
of creation versus ongoing actual or constructive notice of an 
ongoing dangerous condition (as opposed to notice of an event 
like a customer's having dropped a grape or a banana peel on a 
supermarket floor) is, with respect to the premises owner's 
general obligation to make and keep its premises safe, not very 
significant. 
If, as a matter of fact, Little America created an 
unreasonably dangerous condition, it should be held liable. 
If, as a matter of fact, Little America knew or should have 
known that the condition of its asphalt surface was unreason-
ably hazardous, it should be held liable. The Sandra Walraven 
incident of a week prior to the Weinstein incident should not 
analytically be viewed as analogous to a shop owner's knowledge 
of a grape on the floor. It is more appropriately viewed as a 
living example of the dangerousness of a longstanding condi-
tion. Instructive on this point is Martin v. Koer v. Mayfair 
Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967), where the Utah Supreme 
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Court, discussing DeWeese v. J.C. Penney Co., 5 Utah 2d 116, 
297 P.2d 898 (1956), stated: 
That case is distinguishable from the pres-
ent one since the object which caused the 
plaintiff to fall there was the terrazzo 
entrance which was a permanent part of the 
building. There the defendant knew it 
became slippery when it rained. Thus the 
issue as to whether the defendant knew or 
should have known was properly determined. 
The present case is much different since 
the plaintiff fell on a grape which may 
have been put there by anyone. This same 
comparison was made in Hampton v. Rowley 
Builders Supply, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350 P.2d 
151 (1960), which involved the fall on a 
rock present on the defendant's steps. In 
that case the Court stated the following: 
It is obvious without laboring 
the point, that the principle set 
forth in the DeWeese case: that 
the part of the permanent struc-
ture of the building was deemed 
to be known to the defendant, is 
not applicable here. In regard 
to a transitory condition of the 
character here involved, the 
instruction given is consistent 
with well-established law that in 
order to find the defendants 
negligent it must be shown that 
they either knew, or in the exer-
cise of reasonable care should 
have known of any hazardous con-
dition and had a reasonable op-
portunity to remedy the same. 
431 P.2d at 570 (emphasis added). 
It is clear that the duty of Little America to re-
frain from creating a dangerous condition and/or to take steps 
to remedy a dangerous condition of which it knew or should have 
known is implicated on the facts of this case. Little America, 
by the acknowledgment of its own employees, had longstanding 
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knowledge of the fact that its surface was slippery when wet, 
and the testimony of witness Parker as well as the very occur-
rence of the Walraven and Weinstein incidents shows, at least 
as a matter of triable fact, the unreasonably hazardous condi-
tion of the premises. 
POINT II. 
LITTLE AMERICA'S BRIEF MISSTATES THE ISSUES, 
OVERLOOKS AND GLOSSES OVER KEY FACTS, AND 
GENERALLY MISSES THE MARK. 
As Ms. Weinstein trusts the foregoing analysis makes 
clear, Little America's Statement of Issues (appearing at page 
1 of its Brief) is way too narrow. Ms. Weinstein freely con-
cedes that her factual theory, with respect to the question of 
what made the surface so slippery when wet, has to do with 
application of and improper treatment of the sealant. But she 
need not prove what was making the surface as slippery as it 
was. She need prove nothing more, in order to prevail in this 
case, than the unreasonably hazardous condition of the surface 
(a matter of fact to be determined by the jury), the knowledge 
of Little America (as owner in possession of the property) of 
that condition, and the fact that Little America failed to act 
reasonably to remedy the situation (a jury question, at best, 
from Little America's perspective, for it is clear that Little 
America did nothing to deal with the condition). It was Little 
America's property, Ms. Weinstein was a business invitee, and 
Little America owned her the duty to make and keep the condi-
tion reasonably safe for her. Any necessary notice (if, for 
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the sake of discussion, Little America did not "create" the 
dangerous condition) was satisfactorily imparted by the slip-
pery nature of the surface itself, accentuated by the Sandra 
Walraven incident. 
In paragraph 1 of its "Summary of Arguments," appear-
ing at page 10 of its Brief, Little America has stated: 
"plaintiff has failed to show the existence of a dangerous 
condition of Little America premises at the time she fell." 
Ms. Weinstein must ask, in reply, the following rhetorical 
question: if Mr. Parker slipped, if one of his colleagues 
slipped and fell, if Ms. Walraven slipped and fell and slipped 
and almost fell again, and if Ms. Weinstein slipped and fell, 
if Ms. Walraven and Ms. Weinstein were both injured, and if 
there is no evidence to support the proposition that any of 
them had any fault, is there not, at a minimum, a jury question 
with respect to the question of whether the asphalt surface in 
question was dangerous? It was Little America's premises. 
Little America had people working there every day, walking on 
rain-slickened asphalt, probably every time it rained. For 
Little America to argue that it had, as a matter of law, no 
actual or constructive notice of an ongoing, dangerous condi-
tion is not tenable. As is clear from the analysis in the 
Erickson case (discussed at pages 1 to 5 hereof), the ongoing 
condition itself, as opposed to a transitory situation like a 
grape's being dropped on a supermarket floor, imparts notice. 
And try as it might, Little America cannot, in any event, wrig-
11 
gle away from the significance of the Sandra Walraven reported 
incident, with no indication of any fault on her part, just a 
week before Ms. Weinstein's incident occurred. 
Little America spends much of its analysis trying to 
convince the Court that "notice is still an element of Utah 
law, even under the variant to premises liability." Little 
America's Brief at 17. Ms. Weinstein reasserts her contention 
that, under Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah 
App. 1992), and Silcox v. Skaqgs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 
623, 624 (Utah App. 1991), there need be no "notice," actual 
or constructive, if the premises owner creates the dangerous 
condition. Little America's contention to the contrary is 
erroneous. 
In this case there are three possible routes to suc-
cess for Ms. Weinstein: (1) that Little America created the 
condition (with respect to its use of the sealant or something 
else having to do with what was laid down on the surface); 
(2) that Little America had ongoing notice of the at least 
arguably dangerous condition on its premises, even apart from 
the Walraven incident; and (3) that Ms. Walraven was living 
proof of the at least arguable dangerousness of the condition, 
and Little America certainly had notice of the incident in 
which Ms. Walraven was injured. 
Ms. Weinstein takes no issue with the following 
statement from Prosser & Keeton on Torts, appearing at page 22 
of Little America's Brief: "[t]here ^s no liability for harm 
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resulting from conditions from which no unreasonable risk was 
to be anticipated. . . . " The record of this case makes it 
clear, however, that it is, at a minimum, a jury question as to 
whether the condition of the Little America asphalt surface, 
when wet, created, for whatever reason, an unreasonable risk to 
the safety of its business invitees, including Ms. Weinstein. 
Little America reports (Little America's Brief at 22) 
that it has "searched in vain for a Utah case where the land-
owner did not have notice of the dangerousness of the condi-
tion." Little America at no point in its Brief mentions the 
Erickson case. It is most interesting that the dangerous con-
dition there, a wet terrazzo floor, was something which the 
jury determined constituted a condition of which the owner had 
notice, even without any evidence of any injurious incidents 
previous to Ms. Erickson's. Little America cannot distinguish, 
for any practical purposes, Erickson from the facts of this 
case. Little America's reliance (in its Brief at page 28) on 
the fact that "[hjundreds of people walk on the Little America 
premises every day" is unavailing. It will never be known how 
many of those people have slipped, how many have slipped and 
fallen, and how many have slipped and fallen and sustained 
minor or major injuries without bringing those things to the 
attention of Little America. Nor will it ever be known how 
many people brought their slips to the attention of people like 
the one who commented to Ms. Weinstein "oh, that happens here 
all the time" (R. at 184) without making an "official" report 
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to Little America. More importantly, this is the stuff of 
evidence that Little America may wish to develop in support of 
its factual contention that the condition was not dangerous. 
The jury should ultimately be allowed to hear and weigh both 
sides of the story. For, as was explained in the Erickson case 
(232 P.2d at 214-15), the trial court erred in keeping such 
evidence from the jury. The trial court did not err, according 
to the Utah Supreme Court, in allowing the case to go to the 
jury. Part of the teaching of Erickson, for purposes of this 
appeal, is that Little America's surface did not have to be 
injuring people in epidemic numbers in order that liability be 
imposed on Little America. 
Little America glosses over and downplays the fact 
that it knew that the asphalt in its parking lot became slip-
pery when wet. If it knew, it should have done something about 
it. On one level, this case is as simple as that, especially 
if the "extremely slippery" nature of the condition described 
by witness Parker is accurate and given the fact that some 
people, including Ms. Weinstein, did not know that Little 
America's asphalt was hazardous for pedestrian users. If the 
jury accepts the proposition that Little America's slippery 
asphalt was dangerous, the jury will, in all likelihood, readi-
ly conclude that Little America had a duty (even if it was not 
the asphalt sealant that was causing the slippery condition) 
physically to remedy the condition, to warn users of the prop-
14 
erty of the condition, and/or to provide alternative safe pas-
sageways. 
POINT III. 
IF MS. WEINSTEIN NEEDS MR. TURNBOW S 
AFFIDAVIT TESTIMONY TO DEFEAT LITTLE AMERICA'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, IT IS 
SUFFICIENT FOR THAT PURPOSE. 
Ms. Weinstein contends, based on the foregoing analy-
sis, that she does not need Mr. Turnbow's Affidavit to defeat 
Little America's attempt to have the Summary Judgment upheld. 
If the Court determines that she does need it, or any part of 
it, to defeat summary judgment, the Court should determine that 
it is not deficient in any fashion or in the particulars in 
which it must be deficient in order that it be rendered inef-
fectual. A careful reading of the Turnbow Affidavit should 
cause the Court to conclude that, under Butterfield v. Okubo, 
831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992), Mr. Turnbow has stated "specific 
facts which logically support [his] conclusion." There is no 
rule of law that compels an expert affiant, on pain of having 
his or her opinions deemed not worthy of consideration, to 
state every imaginable fact in support of his or her gualifica-
tions or in support of his or her opinions. The Affidavit 
testimony of Mr. Turnbow should satisfy this Court (if the 
Court for some reason determines — contrary to the analysis 
set forth in points I and II of this Brief — that it is neces-
sary to have expert opinion testimony on the subject) that the 
cause of the slipperiness was, likelier than not, the asphalt 
sealant and Little America's failure to deal properly with it; 
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that Little America was, at least as a question of fact for the 
jury, negligent in failing to take appropriate action with 
respect to the sealant; and that that negligence was a proxi-
mate cause of Ms. Weinstein's injuries. A copy of 
Mr. Turnbow's Affidavit (R. at 142-47), with "the specific 
facts that logically support the expert's conclusion" (those 
set forth in paragraphs 7-10) highlighted, is appended hereto. 
POINT IV. 
IF LITTLE AMERICA IS CORRECT IN ITS 
CONTENTIONS IN THIS LAWSUIT, PREMISES 
OWNERS MAY BE FREE, AS A MATTER OF LAW, 
TO FAIL TO REMEDY DANGEROUS CONDITIONS 
UNLESS INJURED PEOPLE CAN EXPLAIN EXACTLY 
HOW THOSE DANGEROUS CONDITIONS CAME INTO BEING 
AND CAN SHOW THAT NUMEROUS PEOPLE HAVE BEEN 
HURT BEFORE THEY ARE HURT. 
If Little America is correct in its contentions in 
this lawsuit, Utah premises owners may be free (without having 
to answer in tort damages to victims of such acts and omis-
sions) not only to create hazardous conditions but also to fail 
to take actions geared toward remedying such conditions once 
such conditions become known or should become known to them. 
The significance of an affirmance of Judge Moffat's granting of 
Little America's Motion for Summary Judgment may well be that, 
unless an injured person can pinpoint, to a certainty, the 
precise cause of the condition that has caused the injury, and 
unless an injured person can show that numerous other people 
(not just: one, as was the case with Sandra Walraven one week 
before Ms. Weinstein's incident) have already been injured, 
landowners in Utah are free to create and to allow to continue 
16 
in perpetuity dangerous conditions on their premises. That 
would not be good. 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Ms. Weinstein urges the Court to reverse the Summary 
Judgment and remand this case for trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c^O day of January, 
1995. 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
Peter C. Collins 
John W. Holt 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, Sharon M. Weinstein 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two (2) true and cor-
rect copies of the foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, on the ^Z£ day of January, 1995, to 
Donald L. Dalton, Esq., VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY, 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600, Post Office Box 45340, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84145. 
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ADDENDUM/APPENDIX 
Peter C. Collins (#0700) 
John W. Holt (#5720) 
WINDER & HASLAM, P.C. 
175 West 200 South, Suite 4000 
Post Office Box 2668 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2668 
Telephone: (801) 322-2222 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON M. WEINSTEIN, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : CHARLES E. TURNBOW 
-v- : 
SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION, a 
Wyoming corporation, dba : Civil No. 910906459PI 
LITTLE AMERICA, : Judge Richard H. Moffat 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO ) 
Charles E. Turnbow, being first duly sworn, deposes 
and says: 
1. I am over the age of 21 years, I have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein, I am fully competent, 
in every respect, to attest to the matters set forth herein, 
and, if asked questions, at trial, dealing with the matters 
attested to herein, I expect to testify, at trial, in sub-
stance, as attested to herein; 
2. Attached hereto and marked as Exhibit 1 is a 
true and correct copy of my current resume, setting forth some 
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of the highlights of my education, background experience and 
qualifications; 
3. The contents of that resume are, by this refer-
ence, incorporated herein; 
4. I have been qualified hundreds of times to give 
expert testimony, in premises liability (primarily "slip-and-
fall") cases, in various state and federal trial courts; I have 
given testimony on such matters in nearly every state of the 
Union; 
5. I was retained by plaintiff's counsel herein to 
provide expert consulting and, in the event that I should be 
asked to do so, to provide expert testimony on behalf of the 
plaintiff herein; 
6. I have reviewed, in connection with my work on 
this case, the following: 
a. Complaint; 
b. Answer; 
c. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's First 
Set of Interrogatories; 
d. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's First 
Request for Production of Documents; 
e. Amendment to Plaintiff's Answers to 
Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories; 
f. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's First 
Set of Interrogatories; 
0002 
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g. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's First 
Request for Production of Documents; 
h. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's First 
Request for Admissions; 
i. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Second 
Set of Interrogatories; 
j. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Second 
Request for Production of Documents; 
k. Response to Plaintiff's Third Set of 
Requests for Production of Documents; 
1. Response to Plaintiff's Third Set of 
Interrogatories; 
m. Response to Plaintiff's Fourth Request for 
Production of Documents; 
n. Response to Plaintiff's Fourth Set of 
Interrogatories; 
o. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Second 
Request for Admissions; 
p. Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Fifth 
Set of Interrogatories; 
q. Transcripts of the following depositions: 
Sharon Weinstein (pages Vol I, pp. 97-133, 175-181; Vol II, 
pp. 314-316 (dealing with all aspects of the accident, rather 
than her damages)); Don Harsh; L. Van Hulten; Lee Arrington; 
Shaun Powis; Al Landvatter; Greg A. Hagelberg, John Stoner; 
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Richard Mills; Sandra Walraven; Al Grabb; Jean Grabb; Bruce 
Parker; and Rick Watterson; 
r. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and the "Corrected" Memorandum in Support 
of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
7. For a period of time following the application 
of asphalt sealant of the general kind applied by defendant in 
or about August 1990, the surface to which the sealant is 
applied will be "slippery when wet"; 
8. That "slippery-when-wet" condition can be sub-
stantially ameliorated, and sometimes eliminated, by steam-
cleaning, under safety-controlled circumstances, thus substan-
tially eliminating the risk of slip-and-fall incidents to 
pedestrians such as the plaintiff, Sharon Weinstein; 
9. The "slippery-when-wet" condition inherent in 
the application of the asphalt sealant of the general kind 
applied by defendant in or about August 1990 had not been 
eliminated or substantially ameliorated prior to the time of 
the Sandra Walraven incident (April 25, 1991) or prior to the 
time of the Sharon Weinstein incident (May 2, 1991); 
10. I am familiar with the standard of care (reason-
able safety practices utilized in the industry), as of 1990 and 
1991, for owners/operators of facilities such as the Salt Lake 
City Little America (including the parking and driving areas) 
owned and operated by defendant; 
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11. Based on my background, education, training, and 
experience, I have formed the following opinion with respect to 
this matter: that the defendant herein, Sinclair Oil Corpora-
tion dba Little America, acted unreasonably, and below the 
standard of care (reasonable safety practices utilized in the 
industry) for owners/operators of such facilities, regarding 
appropriate and safe maintenance of driving and parking areas, 
in the following particulars: 
a. failing to steam-clean or otherwise take 
affirmative steps to cause the "slippery-when-wet" condition of 
the subject surface to be substantially ameliorated, or elimi-
nated, prior to the time of the subject incident; 
b. failing, in light of its knowledge of the 
11
 slippery-when-wet" nature of the surface, to provide a con-
crete or other less slippery and safer walkway for pedestrian 
users such as Sharon Weinstein to use to get to Little America 
residence and meeting rooms located, as was Sharon Weinstein's 
destination meeting room, in buildings other than the main 
Little American building; and 
c. failing to warn persons such as Sharon 
Weinstein of the "slippery-when-wet" character of the surface. 
12. It is also my opinion that the subject incident 
was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the failures 
specified in the immediately preceding paragraph; 
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13. It is also my opinion that there is no reason to 
think that either Sandra Walraven (April 25, 1991), or Sharon 
Weinstein (May 2, 1991), or Jean Grabb (June 30, 1991) slipped 
on anything other than the rain- and sealant-slickened surface 
where she fell; 
14. It is also my opinion that there was nothing 
unreasonable about Sharon Weinstein's conduct, either with 
respect to the shoes she was wearing or the manner in which she 
was walking, or in any other respect, in connection with the 
subject incident. 
DATED this VL day of October, 1993. 
IARLES E. TURNBOW 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 28 day of 
October, 1993. 
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PETER C COLLINS 
'^•r'ULS 
February 22, 1995 
Ms. Marilyn M. Branch 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A10 
DOCKET NO. moj^k 
Re: Weinstein v. Sinclair Oil Corporation (Little America) 
Case No. 940296-CA 
Dear Ms. Branch: 
I represent the plaintiff-appellant in this case. 
This letter is written pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure and is written in response to 
the February 16, 1994 letter to you from Donald L. Dalton, 
counsel for defendant-appellee. I seek to write in the non-
argumentative fashion mandated by that Rule. 
Preston v. Lamb, 436 P.2d 1021 (Utah 1968), does not, as I 
read it, stand for the proposition that the expert's non-
inspection of the premises rendered his opinions incompetent. 
Also, the thrust of what Mr. Turnbow (Ms. Weinstein's expert) 
has to say is not (contrary to the situation in Preston) 
specific to the Little America asphalt surface. Finally, 
contrary to the situation in Preston, and in light of the 
facts of this case and the theories being pursued in this 
case, it is not likely that Ms. Weinstein needs Mr. Turnbow's 
opinions to defeat summary judgment. 
Respe 
PETER INS 
PCC/skt 
cc: Donald L. Dalton, Esq. 
CHARLES E- TURNBOW, P.E. 
Safety Engineer 
21812 Higttway 18, Suite A 
Apple Valley, California 92307 
(019-247-1050 
FAX 247-1746 
EDUCATION 
University of Portland (Oregon), Bachelor of Science, 1958 
(Major Chemistry Minor Physics and Mathematics! 
Oregon State University (Oregon), Graduate Studies, 1958*1961 
Cailfornia College of Law (California), Bachelor of Science (law), 1979, Juris Doctor, 1981 
OCCUPATION AND PHOFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE 
1982 to present Attorney at Law 
[California Slate Bar No. 109126J 
1975 to present Professional Safety Engineer 
[California Registration No. SF 492) 
1980 to 1983 
1974 to 1978 
1971 to 1974 
1967 to 1971 
1965 to 1966 
1963 to 1965 
1961 to 1965 
1958 to 1961 
1954 to 1968 
Partner, McManus Construction Company 
(Commercial and Residential Construction] 
President, Turnbow Research Laboratories, Inc. 
{Safety Engineering and Consulting] 
Owner, Charles E. Turnbow and Associates 
(Safety Engineering and Consulting! 
Research Associate, TruesdaH Laboratories, Inc. 
[Safety Consultant and Chemist) 
Consultant, Assesorla Technlca, S.A. 
[industrial Engineering and Consulting) 
President, RANOEV, INC. 
{Industrial Research and Development] 
Vice-president, Analytical Services, inc. 
(Product and Material TesUng| 
Laboratory Supervisor and Safety Officer, Oregon State University 
(Laboratory Management and Safety Officer) 
Chief Chemist, Borgana Products Co., inc. 
(Laboratory Management) 
ASSOCIATIONS 
American Chemical Society 
National Safety Council 
American Bar Association 
National Fire Protection Association 
American Society of Safety Engineers 
American Industrial Hygiene Association 
InternaUonai Conference of Building Officials 
Society of the Sigma XI 
PUBLICATIONS 
SUp and Fall Pracllco, 1988, Jamea Publishing Group 
